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                                                 Abstract 
It has been alleged that J M Keynes, quoting in the General Theory a 
passage from J S Mill’s Principles, misunderstood the passage in 
question and was therefore wrong to cite Mill as an upholder of the 
‘classical’ proposition that ‘supply creates its own demand’. We believe 
that, although Keynes was admittedly in error with respect to, so-to-say, 
the ‘letter’ of Mill’s exposition, he did not mislead readers as to the 
‘substance’ of Mill’s conception. The purpose of this paper is to 
demonstrate that J S Mill did indeed stand for a ‘classical’ position, 
vulnerable to Keynes’s critique as developed in the General Theory. 
[This is a revised version of an earlier working paper: ‘Keynes, Mill and 
Say’s Law’, Strathclyde Papers in Economics, 2000/11] 
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Introduction 
In setting out in the General Theory his critique of the ‘classical’ analysis Keynes (1936, 
p.18) accused J S Mill of holding to the doctrine that ‘supply creates its own demand’, citing 
as evidence a passage from Mill’s (1866) Principles of Political Economy.  Several critics – 
for instance, Patinkin (1965), Leijonhufvud (1968), Mundell (1968) - have risen to the 
defence of Mill, pointing out that he (demonstrably) did not mean by the passage in question 
what Keynes apparently took it to mean, implying that, with Keynes’s mistaken accusation 
dismissed, there was nothing in Mill’s account to which, from a Keynesian perspective, 
exception could legitimately be taken. 
The purpose of this paper is, however, to establish the validity of Keynes’s basic charge that 
Mill’s treatment of the question of the adequacy of aggregate demand to ensure full use of the 
community’s productive resources was indeed seriously flawed. We argue that while Keynes 
did misunderstand the specific purport of the passage he quoted from Mill, he was 
nevertheless correct in identifying Mill as an upholder of the ‘classical’ thesis that it is 
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production which determines demand, and not vice versa. Mill, as he himself declares, 
adheres to the doctrine of his father and J B Say, though offering a nuanced version to 
accommodate the undeniable real world situation of a general excess demand for money and 
excess supply of goods in a commercial crisis. It would appear that the defenders of Mill 
against Keynes have failed to appreciate just how unsatisfactory Mill’s analysis, taken as a 
whole, actually is. 
The (mis)quotation in question 
In attacking what he saw as the fundamental deficiency of the classical theory of 
employment, Keynes argued (1936, p.18) that: 
From the time of Say and Ricardo the classical economists have taught that supply creates 
its own demand: - meaning by this in some significant, but not clearly defined, sense that 
the whole of the costs of production must necessarily be spent in the aggregate, directly or 
indirectly, in purchasing the product. 
The quotation from Mill immediately follows in illustration: 
In J S Mill’s Principles of Political Economy the doctrine is explicitly set forth: 
What constitutes the means of payment for commodities is simply commodities. 
Each person’s means of paying for the productions of other people consist of 
those which he himself possesses. All sellers are inevitably, and by the meaning 
of the word, buyers. Could we suddenly double the productive powers of the 
country, we should double the supply of commodities in every market, but we 
should, by the same stroke, double the purchasing power. Everybody would 
bring a double demand as well as supply: everybody would be able to buy twice 
as much, because everyone would have twice as much to offer in exchange. 
The critics charge Keynes with misquotation on the ground that Mill did not intend the 
passage to carry the meaning that Keynes apparently attributes to it. Keynes, it appears, takes 
the passage as indicating Mill’s acceptance of what has been termed ‘Say’s Identity’1 - the 
proposition that all sales receipts are automatically and immediately spent on purchasing 
goods and services, or, equivalently, that money functions only as a medium of exchange. It 
can however readily be demonstrated – as the critics have done by setting the passage in 
context – that that was not the point Mill was making. 
The passage in question derives from the Principles, Book III, Chapter XIV, where Mill is 
developing his argument against what he considered the ‘heretical’ view (attributed to 
Malthus, Chalmers and Sismondi)2 that ‘a general oversupply of all commodities in relation 
to aggregate demand is an occurrence to be feared’. In tackling the issue Mill proposes that 
                                                          
1 ‘We shall refer to the version of Say’s law of markets according to which the money value of goods supplied is 
identically equal to that of goods demanded as Say’s identity, a view which precludes attempts to add to 
money balances out of sales proceeds.’ (Hollander, 1985, p.483) See also Patinkin (1965, pp.193-5). 
2 The trio of ‘Malthus, Chalmers and Sismondi’ are frequently identified by Mill as the principal proponents of 
the ‘heretical’ doctrine that the adequacy of planned aggregate demand to ensure full use of the economy’s 
productive capacity should not be taken for granted. 
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‘the two elements of demand’ – ‘the desire to possess’ and ‘the means of purchase’ – should 
each be examined. 
Concentrating first on ‘the means of purchase’, he invites readers to assume that ‘the quantity 
of all commodities produced is not greater than the community would be glad to consume’. 
The question posed, therefore, is whether, if the community does collectively wish to buy all 
the commodities it produces, it could possibly be prevented from doing so by lack of 
purchasing power? The quoted passage gives Mill’s answer: no, he says, that cannot happen. 
The argument is that, when commodities are exchanged on the market, the goods each 
transactor offers for sale are simultaneously elements of supply and potential instruments of 
demand. If, as is being assumed, every transactor is able to sell all that he wishes, the value of 
each individual’s effective purchasing power is equal to the value of what he sells on the 
market; consequently, the value of the total available purchasing power is necessarily equal to 
the value of total supply. Ergo, when members of the community wish to buy all that is on 
offer, sales cannot be constrained for want of purchasing power. 
Thus, as Don Patinkin (1965, p.647) observes, the passage ‘cannot refer to the willingness to 
consume – as Keynes would have it – but to the power to consume. Indeed, when read within 
the context that Mill specifies, this passage expresses nothing more objectionable than the 
‘national income equals national product’ identity of contemporary social accounting!’ 
Furthermore, there is in fact abundant evidence that Mill did not subscribe to Say’s Identity, 
but did recognise that agents might, on occasion, prefer to retain money in hand rather than 
part with it in exchange for commodities. For instance, in his essay ‘Of the Influence of 
Consumption on Production’ (1844, p.276) Mill clearly accepts that income receipts may be 
reserved unspent: 
. . . the effect of the employment of money, and even the utility of it, is that it enables 
[the] one act of interchange to be divided into two separate acts or operations; one of 
which may be performed now, and the other a year hence, or whenever it shall be most 
convenient. Although he who sells, really sells only to buy, he need not buy at the same 
moment when he sells; and he does not therefore necessarily add to the immediate 
demand for one commodity when he adds to the supply of another. The buying and 
selling now being separated, it may well occur, that there may be, at some given time, a 
very general inclination to sell with as little delay as possible, accompanied by an equally 
general inclination to defer all purchases as long as possible. This is always actually the 
case, in those periods which are described as periods of general excess. 
Several writers, not directly involved in the misquotation debate, have also given Mill’s 
macroeconomics what would appear to be a pretty clean bill of health. G S Becker and W J 
Baumol (1952, p.374), referring to Mill’s account of a commercial crisis, famously remarked 
that ‘in reading it one is led to wonder why so much of the present literature . . . had to be 
written at all’. Becker and Baumol’s commendation of Mill’s treatment immediately follows 
their statement (referring to Mill’s essay ‘Of the Influence of Consumption on Production’) 
that  
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it is all there and explicitly – Walras’ Law, Say’s Identity which Mill points out holds 
only for a barter economy, the ‘utility of money’ which consists in permitting purchases 
to be made when convenient, the possibility of (temporary) oversupply of commodities 
when money is in excess demand, and Say’s Equality which makes this only a 
temporary possibility.  
If that were an adequate summing up of Mill’s views, his analysis might seem to involve little 
to which objection might be taken. 
Samuel Hollander (1979, p.475), referring to ‘Mill’s qualifications to the law of markets’, 
endorses the Becker and Baumol appraisal. Recognising Mill’s admission of the possible 
occurrence of excess supplies of labour and commodities along with an excess demand for 
money, Hollander seems to be of the opinion that it is merely Mill’s ‘presumption against a 
“Keynes-like unemployment equilibrium”’ that chiefly separates him from a Keynesian 
position. 
Thomas Sowell (1994, pp.48-9) observes that Mill, having disposed of the ‘dissidents’ goes 
on to discuss ‘the real substance of the issue more clearly and thoroughly than any other 
classical economist’. He points to Mill’s acknowledgement, in both the ‘Influence of 
Production on Consumption’ and in the Principles that, on the occasion of a commercial 
crisis, there ‘is really an excess of all commodities’ and ‘an undersupply of money’. 
In an early response to Keynes’s critical comment on Mill, Frank Knight (1937) anticipated 
the Becker and Baumol, Patinkin and Sowell theme that if account is taken of Mill’s 
recognition of an emergence demand for money in times of particular uncertainty, nothing is 
left of Keynes’s case against Mill. Knight complained that Keynes made no mention of Mill’s 
analysis of a crisis, and that he seemed to be dealing with classical theory ‘at the stage at 
which uncertainty and monetary disturbances are assumed absent’. 
R A Mundell’s response (1968) to the misquotation is particularly hostile to Keynes: he airs a 
suspicion of deliberate misrepresentation – of Keynes mischievously distorting the classical 
argument to create a straw-man target. Whatever may have led Keynes to interpret the Mill 
passage in the way he does, says Mundell, the result is to create a false impression that 
classical treatment of the determination of aggregate demand was fundamentally flawed. 
However J R Davies and F C Casey (1977), and Davies further (1979), on the basis of an 
ingenious piece of literary detective work, reject Mundell’s distasteful suggestion that Keynes 
knowingly misrepresented Mill: they demonstrate pretty convincingly that although Keynes 
was in error in his use of the quotation, he was guilty of nothing worse than carelessness in 
failing to check its original source in Mill’s work; finding the passage instead in  a secondary 
source where it had been misleadingly ‘torn out of context’3, he misread its meaning. Davis 
                                                          
3 Patinkin’s phrase (1965, p.647). 
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and Casey suggest that Keynes presented the quotation in good faith, misrepresentation 
having occurred through genuine misunderstanding.4 
Where then does this leave us on the question of the propriety of Keynes’s charge against 
Mill? If Mill, contrary to Keynes’s allegation in the General Theory did not hold by a crude 
Identity version of Say’s Law, was Keynes’s attack on Mill as representing an untenable 
‘classical’ orthodoxy – as the critics argue – simply without foundation? 
While it has to be accepted that, in the passage quoted by Keynes, Mill is saying nothing to 
which Keynes could legitimately object, it must be remembered that the passage in question 
relates to only one part of Mill’s argument (concerning the ‘means of purchase’); it does not 
follow that the rest of his discussion regarding ‘the desire to possess’ is equally 
unexceptionable. It is a curious fact that the commentators who have so eagerly pointed out 
Keynes’s evident misunderstanding of these particular observations of Mill have completely 
ignored the subsequent part of Mill’s argument regarding the necessary adequacy of aggregate 
demand to match supply. Had they given it their attention, they could not have presumed Mill 
to be ‘in the clear’ on the issue of the impossibility of a demand-deficient ‘general glut’: the 
weakness of his case could not then have gone unnoticed.  
We shall look in a moment into the details of Mill’s analysis, but before doing so, it is 
relevant to note that, from another quarter, Mill is hailed as a great upholder of the tradition of 
thought established by J B Say and James Mill, in fact as the authority credited with giving 
the coup de grace to the contrary doctrine espoused by the ‘heretics’ (Malthus, Chalmers and 
Sismondi) that conditions of ‘glut’ or general unemployment could occur because of an 
overall deficiency of ‘the desire to possess’ relative to the production capacity of the 
economy.  We are referring here to the argument advanced by a forceful modern proponent of 
Say’s law of markets (Steven Kates, 1998) to the effect that the Keynesian focus on aggregate 
demand as the autonomous disturbing factor primarily responsible for fluctuations in output 
and employment is fundamentally misplaced, and that the old classical authorities – including 
J S Mill – were correct in their contention that, while general unemployment could (and 
certainly did) occur, such a state of affairs should not be attributed (Keynesian fashion) to a 
general deficiency of demand. While we certainly have no intention of defending a Say’s Law 
position against the Keynesian approach, we make the point that Kates’s view of how J S Mill 
fits into the context of the nineteenth century ‘general glut’ controversy certainly raises the 
                                                          
4 It seems highly probable, from disparities of detail (identified by Davis and Casey) between Mill’s original text 
and the similarly inaccurate versions reproduced by Marshall and Marshall (1881), Mummery and Hobson 
(1889) and Keynes (1936), that Keynes derived the Mill passage at second or third-hand from the Marshalls or 
from Mummery and Hobson and not directly from Mill’s Principles. We add, given the fact that Keynes had 
been reading (with warm approval) Mummery and Hobson just before he amended a draft of Chapter 2 of the 
General Theory to include the Mill passage (see Keynes, 1973, p.653, also p.537), and R F Kahn subsequently 
thought it useful to send Keynes a copy of the Marshalls’ text, that it looks very much as if the passage, initially 
excerpted out of context by the Marshalls, was borrowed from them by Mummery and Hobson and later in 
turn borrowed from Mummery and Hobson (rather than from the Marshalls) by Keynes for inclusion in the 
General Theory. (J K Whitaker (1975, fn. p.215) refers to Marshall’s (apparently habitual) ‘loose style of 
quotation’.)  
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possibility that Keynes’s characterisation of Mill as a proponent of the sort of ideas to which 
he was objecting may not be as far off the mark as the critics apparently believe.5 
We now proceed to examine Mill’s analysis of the issue of the relationship between aggregate 
demand and unemployment to determine whether or not Keynes was justified in identifying 
Mill as an advocate of the ‘classical’ doctrine which in the General Theory he set out to 
controvert. It is convenient to take Mill’s theory of unemployment in two parts – one 
concerned with the circumstances of a commercial crisis, and a second dealing with the 
question of the adequacy of effective demand to support full employment in normal, non-
crisis, situations. 
Mill on commercial crises: a crisis is not a ‘glut’ as envisaged by the heretics 
J S Mill, unlike his father6, was fully prepared to admit that a commercial crisis could be 
responsible for the emergence (at least temporarily) of excess supplies of goods and of 
unemployment, even generally across the economy; at the same time he argued that such 
unemployment provided no justification for the ‘heretical’ thesis that there was reason to fear 
that want of demand for output could cause economy-wide excess supply and unemployment. 
In other words Mill’s contention was that, despite the observed occurrence from time to time 
of widespread unemployment, Malthus, Chalmers and Sismondi were completely wrong in 
their diagnosis that such conditions were the result of an imbalance between the community’s 
demand for goods and services and the ability of the economy to produce goods and services 
for use by the community. 
We begin with Mill’s contention that the ‘heretics’ – thinking of excess supply relative to 
overall demand – had misunderstood the true nature of a ‘commercial crisis’. He emphasises 
that, as he understands it, a commercial crisis is something very different from, and not to be 
confused with, a ‘general glut’. Malthus’s diagnosis of a glut– as interpreted by Mill – was of 
an economy-wide state of deficient demand, constituting a continuing, long-term depression 
of activity, a situation which would have developed gradually over time. By contrast Mill 
(1866, III, XIV, 4) defined a commercial crisis as a sudden and sharp, but merely temporary, 
self-correcting interruption of normal commercial activity. Such a disturbance he interpreted 
as the result not of insufficient planned demand, but of the opposite state of affairs – of a 
speculative excess of demand, leading to market collapse, a credit crunch and the 
postponement of expenditure. 
                                                          
5 Kates (1998), p.73, summing up on the position of J S Mill in the history of macro analysis, states: ‘Mill is the 
key to understanding the classical law of markets. He sits in a pivotal position at the end of the general glut 
debates, and his influence was one of the main reasons for acceptance [of the law of markets] throughout the 
remainder of the nineteenth century and well into the twentieth. In both the essay and in his Principles he 
provided a clear exposition of the reasoning behind the law of markets. Mill focused on the impossibility of 
demand failure as an explanation for recessions, even while fully recognising that recessions regularly occur. 
6 Samuel Hollander (1985, pp.489-508) describes how Mill, having in his earliest writings followed his father in 
denying the occurrence of general overproduction under any circumstances, in time came to admit that, at 
least on occasions of ‘commercial crisis’, aggregate spending could undoubtedly be deficient in relation to 
output and production capacity. 
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It is a great error to suppose . . . that a commercial crisis is the effect of a general excess 
of production. It is simply the consequence of an excess of speculative purchases. It is not 
a gradual advent of low prices, but a sudden recoil from prices extravagantly high: its 
immediate cause is a contraction of credit.7 
Mill vividly describes how the excessive spending of a speculative outbreak engenders a 
crisis. In the scenario he sketches, dealers in a particular market anticipate a rise in price; the 
extra demand thus induced drives up the price, leading to further speculative buying fuelled 
by credit expansion. Until doubt sets in the market soars, but eventually the price collapses, 
and dealers who have bought high find they cannot meet their obligations. In the ensuing 
panic and general fear of insolvency, traders are desperate to get their hands on ready money, 
but that proves no easy matter. Everyone is disposed   
not only to refuse fresh credit, except on very onerous terms, but to call in, if possible, all 
credit . . . already given; . . . bankers raise their rate of discount, and withhold their 
customary advances; merchants refuse to renew mercantile bills . . . 
And therefore: 
When everybody seems to be losing, and many fail entirely, it is with difficulty that firms 
of known solidity can obtain even the credit to which they are accustomed, and which is 
the greatest inconvenience to them to be without; but because all dealers have 
engagements to fulfil, and nobody feeling sure that the portion of his means which he has 
entrusted to others will be available in time, no one likes to part with ready money or 
postpone his claim to it. To these rational considerations there is superadded, in extreme 
cases, a panic as unreasoning as the previous over-confidence; money is borrowed for 
short periods at almost any rate of interest, and sales of goods for immediate 
payment are made at almost any sacrifice. 
And he acknowledges: 
There may easily be, though only while the crisis lasts, an extreme depression of general 
prices, from what may indiscriminately be called a glut of commodities or a dearth of 
money. 
Thus Mill does admit the possibility of a general excess supply of commodities along with a 
simultaneous excess demand for money, but at the same time he strongly denies that such 
circumstances correspond to those of a ‘glut’ as predicted by Malthus et al – Mill holds that a 
crisis situation can be explained without citing overproduction relative to the wants of the 
community. As Mill sees the situation, agents are hanging on to their money rather than 
spending it - not because their needs are satiated with a superabundance of goods but because, 
in the prevailing circumstances of a crisis, it could quite probably mean commercial suicide to 
do otherwise. 
                                                          
7 That explanation tallies exactly with Mill’s earlier observation (in his 1844 Essay, p.279): ‘As there may be a 
temporary excess of any one article considered separately, so there may be of commodities generally, not in 
consequence of over-production, but from want of commercial confidence’. 
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In Mill’s view, one key factor which distinguishes a commercial crisis from a glut in the sense 
of Malthus and Sismondi is the source of the upset – he understands a crisis to stem from too 
much rather than too little demand.8 Mill reads the situation as the reaction, which spreads 
throughout the system, to the bursting of a speculative bubble generated by excessive demand 
in a particular market. Traders hold back from entering into new commitments because of ‘a 
general mistrust’ of each other’s solvency; intended expenditures are postponed, and money 
retained in the face of what are perceived to be exceptional commercial risks. The fall in 
spending, it may be stressed, is seen as the consequence of prior speculation – ‘overtrading’ - 
not as an autonomous source of disturbance.  
Secondly, Mill attributes withholding of spending under crisis conditions not to any 
independently occurring failure of consumption or investment demand, but to anxiety in the 
markets and the consequent breakdown of the normal commercial mechanisms of lending and 
borrowing, of purchase and sale. Expenditures out of income receipts are postponed – not 
cancelled: thus, as Mill (1844, p.276, quoted above p.3) understands the situation, ‘he who 
sells, really sells only to buy, [although] he need not buy at the same moment when he sells’. 
Corresponding Mill believes that ‘restoration of confidence’ – dissolution of the prevailing 
‘general distrust’ – is all that is required for recovery. Once the ‘temporary derangement of 
markets’ has passed, agents, freed from fear of abnormal commercial risks can, he believes, 
be expected to resume their interrupted activities. When the blizzard of bankruptcies has 
blown over, business quickly returns to normal. 
It is true that this state [of excess demand for money] can only be temporary, and must 
even be succeeded by a reaction of corresponding violence, since those who have sold 
will certainly buy at last, and there will then be more buyers than sellers. 
Thus, as Hollander notes (1979, p.475; 1985, p.503), Mill’s belief in automatic recovery – 
even a dramatic rebound – precludes recognition of the possibility of persisting 
unemployment (unemployment equilibrium) of a Keynesian character. This corresponds to 
the significant difference between Mill’s view of a cyclical downturn and Keynes’s 
interpretation of a depression. Compare Keynes’s point (1936, p.316) that in a slump it is the 
‘collapse of the marginal efficiency of capital which renders the slump so intractable’; by 
contrast, as envisaged by Mill, recovery from a crisis is easy because the situation is not 
attributed to a problem regarding the profitability of investment under normal conditions 
when the mechanisms of commercial intercourse are working properly. In other words, Mill 
reads a recession as symptomatic of a temporary ‘mechanical’ breakdown of the system of 
settling business transactions rather than an underlying general want of will to purchase goods 
and services. For Mill, this squares with continued belief in the Say, James Mill, Ricardo 
proposition that there is no need to worry about a ‘general oversupply of all commodities  
relative to ‘the desire to possess’. 
                                                          
8 While Mill is correct that that the ultimate source of the upset lies in speculative over-production rather than 
in satiety of final demand, the immediate cause is nevertheless an actual deficiency of effective demand – 
because of the reluctance or inability of agents to undertake their normal expenditures under crisis conditions. 
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To sum up on Mill’s interpretation of a commercial crisis. We read Mill, in his analysis of 
aggregate demand over a crisis period, as in effect distinguishing between the ‘desire to 
possess’ and effective or actual demand expressed in market dealings. He is however not 
prepared to admit that the ‘desire to possess’ can be deficient relative to total production. 
Mill’s position involves a semantic difficulty with respect to the term ‘demand’. Let us use 
‘planned demand’ to correspond to Mill’s ‘desire to possess’ - meaning demand which should 
lead to spending – but only when conditions are right. (Actual or effective demand (above) 
means demand as expressed in the market.) During a commercial upheaval, planned demand 
is put on hold, and funds kept in hand against possible emergencies, but when normality 
returns and everyone’s solvency is no longer in question, spending plans which had been 
shelved under crisis conditions, are brought back into play; planned but postponed 
expenditures now become actual demand. The implication is, of course, that restoration of a 
normal level of activity can confidently be expected to accompany, and without delay, the re-
establishment of a normal state of commercial trust and confidence. Such, we believe, is 
Mill’s attempt to square the traditional Says Law doctrine with the indisputable fact that on 
occasion, a general deficiency of demand may be seen to exist. 
It is interesting that Patinkin (1965, pp.649-50, footnote 25) should complain that Mill offers 
no explanation as to how – whether via falling interest rates or the real balance effect – 
demand is supposed to be stimulated and activity restored following a crisis: it rather looks as 
if Patinkin has not understood Mill’s particular conception of the nature of a crisis. From 
Mill’s perspective there is no need of Patinkin’s stimuli to boost demand – planned demand 
has not collapsed; it is merely a matter of allowing sufficient time for the upset in trading 
conditions to subside, allowing businessmen to resume their ordinary dealings with each 
other, free from fear of banks collapsing or of debtors being unable to meet their obligations. 
Planned but temporarily withheld expenditure will automatically emerge as effective demand.  
While Mill is thus prepared to allow that there may be observed, from time to time when a 
commercial crisis breaks out, a general excess of demand for money and excess supply of 
goods, he will not countenance the idea that such a state of affairs is indicative of a general 
deficiency of planned demand relative to productive capacity as predicted by the ‘general 
glut’ theorists. But he does not simply deny that the heretics’ claim is supported by real world 
experience: the principal element of Mill’s case against the heretics (to which we now come) 
is an attempted demonstration that it is actually impossible for a general deficiency of 
aggregate planned demand ever to occur. There cannot be a problem with ‘the desire to 
possess’. 
Mill’s basic argument: planned aggregate demand necessarily corresponds 
to output produced 
We turn now to Mill’s thesis that planned aggregate demand cannot fall short of output 
produced. It may be, as we have just seen, that from Mill’s perspective, in the abnormal 
conditions of a commercial crisis, actual expenditure is temporarily curtailed, but, under 
normal circumstances actual expenditure (effective demand) will correspond to planned 
demand which can be guaranteed to match the value of output produced. 
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John Stuart Mill argues in traditional terms, a la Say and James Mill, that the very act of 
supplying goods to the market implies a corresponding demand for goods – meaning both the 
ability and the will to buy. To offer goods to the market is simultaneously to seek their 
equivalent in return. On this he is quite categorical: 
[W]hoever brings additional commodities to the market, brings an additional power of 
purchase . . . brings also an additional desire to consume; since if he had not that desire, 
he would not have troubled himself to produce. Neither of the elements of demand 
[neither ‘ability’ nor ‘desire’ to purchase] therefore can be wanting, when there is 
additional supply; though it is perfectly possible that demand may be for one thing and 
the supply may unfortunately consist of another.                     (Mill, 1866, III, IV, 3) 
There may, on this argument, be misalignment of supply and demand at the micro level, but 
there can be no overall excess of supply over demand. But could saving cause a problem? 
Mill’s answer is that a readiness to save would not ‘in the smallest degree affect our 
conclusion’. All savings, he contends (abstracting from the temporary aberration of a crisis), 
will – must – be productively employed; income which is saved (by the better-off within the 
community) will automatically pass, via investment, into the hands of the labouring class. And, 
if workers offer themselves for work, they must have unsatisfied needs – they can therefore be 
expected to spend the wages they receive. The spending of the workers can therefore be relied 
upon to offset the savings of the propertied classes. Total planned expenditure is certain to 
equal the value of output produced: output and employment cannot be constrained by 
deficiency of planned demand. 
We need to look more deeply into the basis of Mill’s confident assertion that any volume of 
savings must, via investment, find its way into the hands of spenders. What relationship does he 
suppose between investment and employment? Why does he presume that investors are 
necessarily willing to take up all savings on offer? 
Note first with respect to investment that Mill follows classical convention by explicitly 
including working capital, in particular the means of subsistence of the workforce, in the 
category of investment or producers’ goods. Sometimes, indeed, wage goods destined for the 
support of workers in production are the only form of producers’ goods to which specific 
reference is made; investment is quite typically envisaged as involving simply the purchase of 
wage goods to maintain labour, rather than the acquisition of durable capital goods. 
This treatment of capital as essentially comprised of wage goods is not of course, in itself, 
invalid: nevertheless there is a potential for confusion in the proposition that the resources 
which constitute savings by one party end up as the consumption of another. Whether Mill – 
giving the impression of supposing that the only spending motive to which attention need be 
paid in explaining aggregate demand is the desire by one party or the other, to consume – is 
himself confused, is something we shall have to consider. At any rate, while focusing on 
consumption spending by the workers, he gives no attention at all to the inducement to invest – 
that is to say, to the incentive for the capitalists to commit resources to the employment of 
labour.  
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In the Principles (Book III, Chapter XIV, ‘Of Excess of Supply’) Mill meets the ‘general glut’ 
protagonists head on. He states his intention of dealing with the question of the possible 
deficiency of aggregate demand by examining separately ‘the two elements of demand’ – ‘the 
desire to possess’ and ‘the means of purchase’. This is of course where, so to say, we came in: 
the famously misquoted passage is introduced to establish that the ability to purchase cannot 
fall short of the value of output produced. The ability to buy thus dealt with, Mill turns to the 
crucial matter of the desire to buy. 
Mill is determined to demolish the ‘heretical’ thesis that ‘the general produce of industry may 
be greater than the community desires to consume’. He seeks to demonstrate that, no matter 
how large a proportion of their income the wealthy save, demand and employment will not be 
affected. 
For what do these persons do with their savings? They invest them productively; that is, 
expend them in employing labour. In other words, having purchasing power belonging to 
them, more than they know what to do with, they make over the surplus of it for the general 
benefit of the labouring class. Now, will that class also not know what to do with it? Are we 
to suppose that they too have their wants perfectly satisfied, and go on labouring from mere 
habit? Until this is the case; until the working classes have also reached the point of satiety 
– there will be no want of demand for the produce of capital, however rapidly it may 
accumulate: since, if there is nothing else for it to do, it can always find employment in 
producing the necessaries or luxuries of the labouring class. . . . in whatever manner the 
question is looked at, even though we go to the extreme verge of possibility to invent a 
supposition favourable to it, the theory of over-production implies an absurdity.                                                                   
(Mill, 1866, III, XIV, 3) 
In contending that by saving the propertied classes ‘make over’ their surplus purchasing 
power to labourers who can confidently be expected to make full use of everything that comes 
their way, Mill was returning to the argument he had developed earlier in his treatise (Mill, 
1866, I, V, 3) against the ‘common doctrine’ (again associated with Malthus, Chalmers and 
Sismondi) that ‘the unproductive expenditure of the rich is necessary to the employment of 
the poor’. The point he was attempting to make was that, far from luxury spending by the rich 
being vital for the well-being of the working class, it is in fact their saving that benefits the 
labour force. As reassurance to the sceptical Mill proposes the following ‘extreme case’ to 
demonstrate that, however much the well-to-do save out of their incomes, an increase in 
savings will not adversely affect employment through a shortfall of aggregate demand. 
As it is allowable to put any case by way of hypothesis, let us imagine the most extreme 
case conceivable. Suppose that every capitalist came to be of the opinion that not being 
more meritorious than a well-conducted labourer, he ought not to fare better; and 
accordingly laid by, from conscientious motives, the surplus of his profits: or suppose his 
abstinence not spontaneous but imposed by law or opinion on all capitalists, and upon 
landowners likewise. Unproductive expenditure is now reduced to its lowest limit: and it is 
now asked, how is the increased capital to find employment? Who is to buy the goods it 
will produce? There are no longer customers even for those which were produced before. 
The goods, therefore (it is said) will remain unsold; they will perish in the 
warehouse.  (Mill, 1866, I, IV, 3) 
12 
 
Then comes Mill’s characteristic argument: 
But this is seeing only one-half of the matter. In the case supposed, there would no longer 
be any demand for luxuries, on the part of capitalists and landowners. But when these 
classes turn their income into capital, they do not thereby annihilate their power of 
consumption; they do but transfer it from themselves to the labourers to whom they give 
employment. Now, there are two possible suppositions in regard to the labourers; either 
there is, or is not, an increase of their numbers, proportional to the increase of capital. If 
there is . . . the production of necessaries for the new population, takes the place of the 
production of luxuries for a portion of the old, and supplies exactly the same amount of 
employment which has been lost. But suppose that there is no increase of population. The 
whole of what was previously expended in luxuries, by capitalists and landlords, is 
distributed amongst the existing labourers, in the form of additional wages. We will 
assume them to be already sufficiently supplied with necessaries. What follows? The 
labourers become consumers of luxuries; and the capital previously employed in the 
production of luxuries is still able to employ itself in the same manner: the difference 
being that the luxuries are shared among the community generally, instead of being 
confined to a few. . . . Thus the limit of wealth is never deficiency of consumers, but of 
producers and productive power. Every additional capital gives to labour either additional 
employment, or additional remuneration. 
Taking these passages together, the basis of Mill’s assurance to his readers that saving, or 
more specifically, an increase of saving out of current income, poses no threat to the reliable 
absorption by planned demand of all output offered for sale. His argument may be 
summarised thus: (i) when the capitalists or landlords save out of their incomes, they do not 
hoard money, but ‘turn their income into capital’, which is understood to mean investing their 
savings in the productive employment of labour; (ii) in doing this, the wealthy savers ‘make 
over the surplus (of their incomes) to the general benefit of the labouring class’ or, in other 
words, do not ‘annihilate’ but ‘transfer’ their purchasing power to the labourers to whom they 
give employment; (iii) the workers – whether or not their number increases – have no problem 
in utilising the additional purchasing power which comes into their hands. Income not 
required by the propertied classes for their own consumption, having thus been ‘transferred’ 
to the labouring class, is naturally expended in purchasing the goods and services demanded 
by that class. Either the same workers enjoy a larger share of national output, or additional 
workers spend their wages on an augmented supply of wage goods. All output produced is 
absorbed by the consumption of the rich and poor together in society; a general want of 
planned expenditure is not on the cards. 
Whose demand counts? 
Let us use a simple model to examine Mill’s thesis. Suppose a two-sector surplus-producing 
economy. The wage goods sector employs 70 units of labour to produce (per annum) £100 
worth of wage goods; the luxury goods sector employs 30 labour and produces £40 worth of 
luxury goods. The wage rate is £1 per unit of labour per annum. The workers spend all their 
incomes on wage goods, and the capitalists, who employ the workers, spend all their profits 
on luxuries. The annual wage bill totals £100 (£70 paid in wage goods production and £30 in 
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production of luxuries), all of which goes to purchase wage goods; total profits are £40 (£30 
in the wage goods sector and £10 in luxury goods) and, in the situation initially assumed, 
those profits are wholly expended on the acquisition of luxury goods. (For simplicity we 
exclude the possibility that the capitalists consume a share of basic wage goods.) 
Suppose there now occurs Mill’s postulated outbreak of thrift, with the capitalists deciding to 
cut out their luxury consumption. What happens then? The capitalists, we are told, ‘invest 
their savings productively’, they ‘expend them in the employment of productive labour’.  (We 
suppose that wage goods represent all the producers’ goods required to support labour in 
employment.) Thus the capitalists’ demand is switched from luxuries to wage goods to be 
used ‘to put labour into motion’. Following this change in the pattern of demand, total 
employment remains at 100, but wage goods production replaces luxury production; with all 
labour now engaged in the wage goods sector, the output of wage goods is increased (say, 
proportionately) from £100 to £143 worth of wage goods. There are then, according to Mill, 
two possibilities: the labour force increases (say, by immigration) pari passu with the increase 
in the supply of wage goods, or it remains as before. 
Before considering these alternative scenarios regarding the size of the labour force, we ask: 
why should it be supposed in the first place that labour released from luxury production will 
automatically be re-deployed to the production of wage goods? If the overall current demand 
for output has suddenly slumped (and in Mill’s story, nothing else apart from the onset of 
thrift seems to be happening) why should capitalists in these circumstances wish to expand 
production capacity by so increasing the stock of resources as to be able to put 43% extra 
labour ‘into motion’? If workers actually are transferred from producing luxuries to producing 
wage goods, the current supply of wage goods will, it is true, be consumed by the whole 
existing (100) labour force, but – the question is - who is to consume the additional supply of 
wage goods that will result from the altered pattern of  production? The profitable transfer of 
workers between sectors will depend not on the fact that the present workers are sure to 
consume the wage goods their wages command, but on the capitalists’ expectations about the 
existence of a market for the extra output of wage goods (£43) which the expanded workforce 
(from 70 to100) in the wage goods sector would produce in the future.  
And, if that increased output of wage goods were to be taken up by a proportionate increase in 
the total employment (from 100 to 143) same issue arises again: the means to support a 
further increase in the number employed (from 143 to 204) will be created – but will these 
resources be put to use? Again, it is not their own demand for wage goods that ensures 
employment of workers, but the employers’ expectation that there will be sufficient future 
demand to yield a profit on the further output these 204 units of labour will produce.  
The way in which Mill tells the story is misleading. Extra workers may well consume the 
additional supply of wage goods, but, if they do, it is not – as Mill would seem to imply – 
these workers’ own natural willingness to purchase wage goods that is the critical factor in 
ensuring that an extra supply of wage goods does not go to waste. Additional employees will 
be able to buy wage goods only if the capitalists think it worthwhile to invest in their 
employment. In our example, the unemployed producers of luxuries, will be transferred to 
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wage goods production only if the capitalists believe that an additional supply of wage goods 
(beyond what these workers transferred to that sector will themselves consume) can be sold at 
a profit. And so on – for an increased output of wage goods to be taken up via additional 
employment, the determining factor is always the capitalists’ expectations that profit can be 
made (that surplus value can be raised) from the sale of the surplus output that will be 
produced. It would seem therefore that Mill is focusing on the wrong motive for expenditure. 
He makes much of the workers’ readiness to spend, but that is beside the point. As regards the 
generation of demand, it is the motivation of the capitalist employers that is crucial - whether 
or not the capitalists consider future prospects of profit (and future labour requirements) 
sufficiently attractive to justify ‘putting into motion’ the labour in question. The workers 
cannot be regarded as independent agents whose needs create an alternative source of demand 
which will automatically compensate for a cut in consumption by the propertied classes. 
The alternative possibility envisaged by Mill is that following the postulated outbreak of thrift 
amongst the wealthy, no increase takes place in the number of available workers and the 
surplus luxury goods are distributed to the existing workforce. Presumably the supposition is 
that the capitalists attempt to take on more labour, and that the supply of labour being 
completely inelastic, real wages are bid up bringing the workers to a luxury-goods-consuming 
level of income. At any rate, Mill is again arguing that the workers will consume what the 
thrifty capitalists have left aside. Consider what this means in terms of our example. The 
output of luxury goods previously purchased out of profits is now acquired by the workforce. 
In other words the workers have command not only of the current output of wage goods, but 
of everything else produced – the wage bill paid by the employers constitutes purchasing 
power over all national output. The rate of profit is reduced to zero with the disappearance of 
the capitalists’ share of output. That does not seem conducive to equilibrium at full 
employment in a capitalist economy. 
Let us pause to take stock. Why was Mill so confident that, even in the (notional) extreme 
case of the propertied classes being stricken by conscience into giving up luxury living, 
aggregate demand for the economy’s output would be kept up? There seem to be two 
possibilities. On the face of it, it might appear that, in focusing on the readiness of workers to 
spend on consumption, Mill had simply lost sight of the critical fact that the capitalists’ 
willingness to undertake investment is the crucial factor in ensuring that the available supply 
of wage goods does not go to waste: the workers’ purchasing power depends on their being 
employed. Did Mill fall into the error of imagining that consumption spending, financed by 
the ‘transfer’ of purchasing power to the labourers, was all that mattered in maintaining the 
level of demand in the face of increased saving by the well-to-do? Could his mode of 
representing capital goods by wage goods have led to led to that confusion? 9 
                                                          
9 Note that Hollander (1985, pp.374-5) admits that Mill’s discussion of these matters is less than satisfactory; 
thus: ‘ . . . the increased outflow of wage goods is at the expense of other categories of commodities and 
should not be confused with the net expansion of output resulting from the expanded capacity of the system. 
Mill seems to have confused the two.’ . . . [Mill states] “the production of necessaries for the new population, 
takes the place of the production of luxuries for a portion of the old”. Hollander comments, ‘This may be true, 
15 
 
While it is certainly the case that the incentive for capitalists to invest receives no explicit 
consideration in Mill’s argument to the effect that the savings of the wealthy are offset by the 
spending of the workers, it is difficult to believe that he could have taken workers’ readiness 
to spend on consumption goods to be the sole factor in maintaining demand and employment. 
It is clear enough from Mill’s account – even though nothing whatever is said about the 
prospective profitability of investment – that it is investment which effects the transfer of 
purchasing power from savers to workers. And as regards investment, Mill was well aware 
that ‘the producer’s object and aim is to derive a profit from his capital’. Bearing in mind that 
he devotes a whole chapter of the Principles (Book II, Chapter XV) to explaining that a 
prospect of profit is the necessary inducement for capitalists to postpone consumption, put in 
personal effort and to risk resources on investment, it is improbable that in the context of his 
‘maximum savings’ example Mill simply overlooked the investment incentive: he must have 
had some explanation of investors’ behaviour in mind. What we suggest – going by what Mill 
says elsewhere – is that he took it for granted that properly-directed investment in the 
employment of labour must necessarily (crisis conditions aside) be profitable to the capitalist, 
implying that there is no cause to fear that savings may not always be accompanied by an 
equal volume of intended investment. 
Saving, Investment and Profits 
On what grounds is Mill’s confidence that planned investment can be relied upon to match 
savings based? Does he rely on changes in the rate of interest to bring savings and intended 
investment into equality? While he does speak elsewhere of the rate of interest as determined 
by demand and supply of loanable funds, in the context of his maximum savings example, 
there is no hint at all of interest playing an equilibrating role. There is no suggestion that, with 
the postulated sharp increase in savings, interest falls so as to bring savings and investment 
into line by mutual adjustment – no sign that Mill sees the balancing of saving and investment 
as the ex post outcome of a market process. Mill’s position appears to be that no ‘balancing’ is 
required – that whatever addition is made to savings, an equal amount of investment will 
automatically fill whatever savings gap emerges. This belief would, in turn, have to depend on 
the presumption of adequate profitability to the investor of whatever volume of investment 
was required to match the current volume of savings. 
As to the profitability of intended investment, Mill holds that (at least so long as the direction 
of investment is appropriate and resources are available at acceptable cost) the capitalist can 
be confident of profit on his outlay. The generation of profit, Mill believes, is the natural and 
characteristic outcome of investment in the employment of productive labour. He explains 
what he understands to be the true source of profits: 
It thus appears that the two elements on which, and which alone, the gains of the 
capitalists depend, are, first, the magnitude of the produce, in other words the 
productive power of labour; and secondly, the proportion of the produce obtained by the 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
but it does not in itself explain the source of purchasing power for the net flow of output from the expanded 
national capacity once in place.’ 
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labourers themselves; . . . These, therefore are . . . the circumstances which determine 
the rate of profit: and it cannot be in any way affected except through one or other of 
them. . . . And there is no other combination of circumstances, in which the general rate 
of profit of a country, in all employments indifferently, can either rise or fall.          
(Mill, 1866, II, XIV, 7) 
For Mill, that is to say, the source of profit lies in the ability of productive labour to produce a 
surplus of output over the renewal of all means of production including the maintenance of 
the labour employed. He insists – no qualification allowed – that the only factors on which the 
profit of the capitalist depends are the productivity of labour and the share of the surplus over 
all other costs of production which falls to labour. As Mill fully appreciates (Principles, II, 
XV, 7) he is simply reiterating Ricardo’s theory of profit. What is significant in the present 
context is that Mill apparently accepts, without any reservation, all that Ricardo’s analysis 
might be taken to imply. As to the implications, Ricardo himself states: 
There cannot then be accumulated in a country any amount of capital which cannot be 
employed productively, until wages rise so high in consequence of the rise of 
necessaries, and so little consequently remains for the profits of stock, that the motive 
for accumulation ceases.                                                           (Ricardo, 1821, p.193)                                
Joseph Schumpeter and Samuel Hollander each spell out the full implications of the 
unqualified Ricardian theory. Thus Schumpeter (1954, p.261, fn.8) ‘except for a rise in the 
real value of wages, investment is possible to an infinite extent without depressing the rate of 
profits’. Likewise Hollander (1979, p.522): ‘The Ricardian position [is] that in the absence of 
the operation of diminishing returns, or any other force causing ‘real’ wages to vary, the 
demand for investment funds based upon capital productivity will be infinitely elastic . . .’ 
That, we believe, is exactly how Mill interpreted Ricardo’s theory: his presumption seems to 
have been that, given appropriate conditions in respect of productivity and real wages, the 
profitability of investment can be taken for granted. The trouble is that Ricardo’s abstraction 
from, or neglect of, the implications for anticipated profits of expected market conditions 
makes unreserved adoption of his theory of profits completely inappropriate for Mill’s 
defence of the Say’s Law proposition that demand depends on supply. The fact that under 
given circumstances the productivity of labour may be such as to make possible a physical 
surplus of output over all costs including the wage bill, does not mean that at the same time 
market conditions, that is to say the state of demand for output and expected prices, are 
necessarily such that the investor can look forward to a corresponding return in terms of 
surplus value. Output must be expected to sell at a profit in terms of value to induce an 
investor to commit his resources to productive activity. 
It is evident that Mill’s understanding of investment determination is questionable. He does 
not seem to appreciate that a prospective value surplus, not just a potential surplus of physical 
output is essential for production and investment to be undertaken. He insists (1866, II, xiv, 7) 
that ‘profit arises, not from the incident of exchange, but from the productive power of labour, 
and the general profit of the country will always be what the productive power of labour 
makes it, whether any exchange takes place or not’. But what if, say, a brick maker producing 
more than enough bricks to make a profit if these bricks are sold, finds stocks of unsold 
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output building up, because investors elsewhere in the economy are for some reason reluctant 
to risk their capital? It certainly does matter to the brick maker whether ‘exchange takes place 
or not’. Nor does it follow – as Mill claims (1866, II, XV, 6) – from the fact of the physical 
productivity of the economic system that, ‘if the labourers of a country collectively produce 
twenty per cent more than their wages, profits will be twenty per cent, whatever prices may or 
may not be’. Mill seems to be missing the point that the twenty per cent surplus of real items 
must be sold for money if the employers are to profit from the employment of these labourers. 
For the transformation of a physical surplus into a value surplus – which of course is what the 
capitalist is seeking - exchange and prices do matter. Mill certainly appears to us to be 
labouring under a misapprehension when he dismisses as superficial misunderstanding the 
‘popular’ view that ‘it is by the sale of their goods that [capitalists] replace their capital and 
add to its amount’. 
Mill’s several ‘fundamental propositions concerning capital’ indicate a general belief that, to 
explain levels of output, investment and employment within the economy it is to supply-side 
factors - the availability of producers’ goods and the availability of labour  - and not  to 
conditions of demand for output  that we should look. As a corollary of the unexceptional 
proposition that ‘industry is limited by capital’, Mill states: 
While, on the one hand, industry is limited by capital, so on the other, every increase of 
capital gives, or is capable of giving, additional employment to industry; and this 
without assignable limit. . . . What I do intend to assert is, that the portion [of capital] 
which is destined [to the maintenance of labourers] may (supposing no alteration in 
anything else) be indefinitely increased, without creating an impossibility of finding 
them employment: in other words, if there are human beings capable of work, and food 
to feed them, they may always be employed in producing something.                                           
(Mill, 1866, I, V, 3) 
Accordingly, that demand for output should not be seen as a constraint on investment and 
employment is affirmed explicitly in Mill’s ‘fourth proposition concerning capital’: 
What supports and employs productive labour, is the capital expended in setting it to 
work, and not the demand of purchasers for the produce of the labour when completed. 
Demand for commodities is not demand for labour. The demand for commodities 
determines in what particular branch of production the labour and capital shall be 
employed: it determines the direction of the labour; but not the more or less of the labour 
itself, or of the maintenance or payment of the labour. These depend on the amount of 
capital, or other funds directly devoted to the sustenance and remuneration of labour.  
(Mill, 1866, I, IV, 9) (Emphasis added) 
That proposition is accompanied by Mill’s argument (1866, I, V, 9) that it is to the benefit of the 
labouring class if a well-to-do individual saves from his income, rather than spending his abundant 
purchasing power on luxuries. Mill’s point is that saving adds to the stock of capital available for the 
employment of labour – more wage goods are produced and accordingly more workers employed; the 
alternative is that luxury goods are enjoyed by the wealthy consumer with no increase in employment. 
So Mill asks, would those who (a la Malthus) advocate spending rather than saving by the rich follow 
the logic of their position, and argue that it is more beneficial to the poor for the well-to-do spend on 
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luxuries rather than directly contribute some portion of their incomes to the poor by paying the Poor 
Law dues? We see again here how Mill takes it for granted that purchasing power put aside from 
consumption will always be employed to buy goods and services, whether it is directly transferred into 
the hands of paupers (plausible) or into indirectly, via the hands of business borrowers, as payment to 
labourers who, it is assumed, are sure to be employed (questionable).10  
From Mill’s perspective, all available resources can safely be put into capital accumulation. The 
volume of worthwhile investment cannot be limited by want of demand for output. Demand comes 
into the reckoning only in the secondary role of determining the appropriate distribution among the 
various sectors of the economy of the savings-determined volume of investment. And so Mill 
concludes, with a blast directed at the ‘heretics’: 
Nothing can be more chimerical than the fear that the accumulation of capital should 
produce poverty and not wealth, nor that it will ever take place too fast for its own end. 
Nothing is more true than that it is produce which constitutes a market for produce, and 
that every increase of production, if distributed without miscalculation among all kinds 
of produce in the proportions which private interest would dictate, creates, or rather 
constitutes,  its own demand.                                                                 (Mill, 1844, p.278) 
Note that, in considering capitalists’ willingness to invest under normal conditions (that is, in the 
absence of the dramatic circumstances of a commercial crisis), Mill makes no mention whatever of the 
phenomenon he emphasised so strongly as affecting investors’ behaviour under crisis conditions –
liquidity preference. Mill certainly understands how, when in a crisis confidence collapses, the result is 
a desperate desire for the security which derives from holding money; but that insight is not carried 
over to his general discussion of investment behaviour. That is surely inconsistent: if uncertainty about 
investment outcomes in the particular circumstances of a commercial crisis causes businessmen to 
withhold expenditure on producers’ goods, is it not readily conceivable that, more generally, 
uncertainty with regard to the longer-term results of investment projects might also cause investors to 
hold back from committing their capital? Even if a businessman is reasonably confident of the 
solvency of those with whom he is currently dealing there remain plenty of reasons for uncertainty as 
to the prospects of a venture under consideration. But Mill seems to believe that, at all times other than 
those of a commercial crisis, there is nothing to hold back investors, if they have resources to hand, 
from spending. Investors, he apparently supposes, can always be confident of a positive outcome from 
exploiting the opportunities which, it is presumed, will necessarily present themselves.  
There is surely here  a serious inconsistency in Mill’s thinking. It might seem that, in his account of 
crises, Mill had opened a door to a realistic consideration of investment decision-making generally 
under normal circumstances – in other words, under conditions that is to say, not of crisis, but 
nevertheless of uncertainty. That door was however slammed shut when he came to consider the 
contention of Malthus and the others that situations could arise in which – even without the drama of a 
commercial crisis – investors might be unwilling to risk their resources on the acquisition of illiquid 
capital goods. The possibility is not admitted that, even though resources may be available, 
opportunities for the profitable utilisation of these resources in investment may not appear to exist 
anywhere in the economy. 
                                                          
10 ‘I conceive that a person who buys commodities and consumes them himself, does no good to the labouring 
classes; and it is only by what he abstains from consuming, and expends in direct payments to labourers in 
exchange for labour, that he benefits the labouring classes, or adds anything to the amount of their 
employment.’ (Mill, 1866, I, V, 9) 
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Mill’s perspective 
It seems clear that, at root, on the question of the possibility of an economy-wide want of 
demand, J S Mill remained loyal to the doctrine of his father and J B Say. Making the point in 
the Principles (1866, Book III, Chapter XIV, 4) that ‘a general over-production of 
commodities’ is not something to be feared, Mill acknowledges his predecessors and mentors, 
. . . it is but justice to two eminent names, to call attention to the fact that the merit of 
having placed this most important point in its true light belongs principally, on the 
Continent, to the judicious J B Say, and in this country to Mr Mill.  
That acknowledgement is, we think, highly significant: we read it as the explicit give-away 
that Mill’s understanding of the working of a macro economy is – despite his admission of the 
possibility in certain circumstances of an excess demand for money and excess supply of 
commodities - diametrically opposed to that of Keynes.  
Keynes holds that it is effective demand that induces production; Mill’s position is that 
production creates demand. The doctrines of Messrs Say and James Mill are so firmly 
ingrained in his mind that he cannot see any merit in the alternative view – that ‘the desire to 
possess’ might, on occasion, be insufficient to take up all the output the economy is capable 
of producing. He does – perforce, because the observed facts of a general flight to money and 
excess supply of commodities in times of crisis cannot be denied - break with the received 
view, but (as we have seen) makes a point of emphasising that such a state of affairs as he 
admits is not - as argued by ‘Malthus, Chalmers and Sismondi’ - attributable to a deficiency 
of planned demand. Mill is trying desperately to save the Say-James Mill position that 
production guarantees an equivalent volume of planned demand. His argument seems though 
to involve an element of sophistry – he has it that ‘the desire to possess’ is reliable and no 
source of trouble, while at the same time admitting that ‘actual’ demand may indeed be 
deficient. Thus according to Mill, demand (in one sense) is determined a la Say and James 
Mill by production, while simultaneously demand (in another sense) may indeed fall short of 
the value of output produced. But Mill cannot have it both ways. From the ‘heretical’ 
perspective, what is relevant to the determination of output and employment is actual demand 
as expressed in the market; agents may harbour a plan or ‘desire to possess’, but if for 
whatever reason they do not act, regardless of the supposed ‘desire to possess’, excess 
supplies of goods and labour will appear. Actual unemployment corresponds to actual 
demand. 
The fact that Mill’s thinking was dominated by the conventional doctrine is clear not only 
from his tribute to his father and J B Say, but from his categorical rejection of the contrary 
views of Malthus, Chalmers and Sismondi. We haven’t here the space to review in detail the 
analyses of Say, James Mill and other upholders of the ‘law of markets’ with which Mill was 
in accord, but Steven Kates (himself a present-day proponent of that ‘law’) conveniently 
summarises (2003, pp.2-3 and p.7) the substance of the orthodox doctrine as understood in the 
early nineteenth century. Thus: 
20 
 
There [was] clearly no need to fear that insufficient demand will lay an economy low. 
This was the core conclusion of the law of markets, that whatever else might befall an 
economy, too little demand relative to production would never occur. 
Or, in other words:  
Demand is constituted by supply. Aggregate demand is not independent of aggregate 
production but is identical with it. A community’s purchasing power is constituted by its 
value added.  
Kates adds that  
[T]he one issue that was raised was that saving might be excessive yet this too, was seen 
as unimaginable. Capital formation could not be too large irrespective of how much of a 
nation’s resources might be devoted to it. . . . [James] Mill thus denied that demand 
deficiency could occur and in particular that it could not occur due to oversaving. He 
insisted that because demand is constituted by supply the purchasing power to buy 
everything produced was there and because of the infinity of demand all available 
production would be absorbed into sales.11 
Such was the climate of opinion in which J S Mill grew up, and such were the views to which, 
in principle, he consistently remained wedded. Probably in much the same way as it is 
difficult today for an economist of Keynesian persuasion to see world from the perspective 
that production determines demand, so it must have been difficult for one brought up in the 
Say-James Mill tradition to comprehend the radically different conception espoused by the 
‘heretics’. As Kates (above) puts it, the situations predicted by the ‘heretics’ were, from the 
orthodox viewpoint, ‘unimaginable’. J S Mill, himself revealing a want of imagination in 
failing to grasp what the ‘heretics’ were getting at, complained (1866, III, XIV, 1) that [their] 
‘doctrine appears to me to involve so much inconsistency in its very conception, that I feel 
considerable difficulty in giving any statement of it which shall be at once clear, and 
satisfactory to its supporters’. 
Mill was however very clear about what he himself believed to be the correct understanding 
of the working of the economy. We have already quoted his categorical assertion of the basic 
Say-James Mill theory of aggregate demand – the proposition that: ‘[W]hoever brings 
additional commodities to the market brings an additional power of purchase . . . brings also 
an additional desire to consume; since if he had not the desire, he would not have troubled 
himself to produce’.  
As we understand Mill, the above proposition – that production determines demand – is 
fundamental to his thinking: it underpins all of what he says about aggregate demand, output 
and employment. Thus: (1) As we have already noted, in his account of commercial crises, 
Mill was anxious to reconcile the view of his father and J B Say with the observed phenomena 
of a crisis, which left him in the rather awkward position of arguing that a ‘general glut’ of 
commodities is actually possible, but not because the ‘desire to possess’ has failed. (2) Mill’s 
                                                          
11 As we have seen with J S Mill, the threat that saving out of income might upset the Say-James Mill applecart 
is snuffed out by turning savings into a form of consumption. 
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several ‘propositions concerning capital’ make sense only on the understanding that an 
autonomously occurring general deficiency of demand is an impossibility – that if production 
capacity is created, and goods are produced, corresponding additional demand can be relied 
upon to match that supply. (3) The contention that capitalists’ profits are determined by the 
productivity of labour and the share of output going to labour depends for its validity on the 
presumption that there is no problem in finding a market for the output produced. We incline 
to the view that Mill’s contention that (given appropriate conditions of productivity and 
wages) that investment without limit will be worthwhile derives from the Say’s Law belief 
that no constraints need be feared from the side of demand, rather than, vice versa, that the 
Ricardian theory of profit justifies confidence in Say’s Law. 
The very act of supply, Mill emphatically states, implies a corresponding ‘desire to possess’. 
That conception of economic activity can be represented by the expression C–M–C: 
commodities are produced, sold for money and the money used to buy other commodities. 
The purpose of economic activity is to acquire commodities (for consumption); the producer 
either consumes his own product or exchanges it for the products of others. Money is no more 
than an intermediary which facilitates exchange – the cycle begins and ends with 
commodities; sales receipts will be re-spent: even if the possibility of some delay in 
completing the business is allowed, no transactor intends to pull out of the market in the 
middle of the exchange process with money in hand instead of goods. In that situation ‘the 
means of purchase’ and ‘the desire to possess’ are both automatically present: it is in fact the 
desire to possess goods that induces the supply of goods to the market.  
That schema may adequately represent what happens in a pre-capitalist economy with, say, 
cultivators taking produce to weekly markets and exchanging their surplus corn or cabbages 
for the clothes or tools brought to market by village craftsmen; but it does not describe what 
underlies commercial activity in a capitalist economy. The object of the capitalist is to turn 
money into more money – to realise surplus value by employing capital in productive activity. 
The appropriate representation is therefore: M–C–M’.  Money is used to buy goods (including 
labour services) which are transformed though a process of production into goods of greater 
value, which are then sold at a profit, at a rate calculated in terms of money The capitalist, 
having started with a quantity of money capital aims to complete the cycle not with goods, but 
with money - more money than he started with. The purpose of the operation is to capture 
surplus value, not end up with an expanded stock of goods. 
J F Henry (2003, p.193) focuses on this fundamental feature of capitalist reality, making the 
point that the economic world as envisaged by Say and the Mills is ‘not the economy that 
exists’. He cites Keynes (and Marx) as making exactly the same point. Thus Keynes (1933) in 
an early draft of what would become the General Theory (Keynes, 1979, pp.66-82), 
distinguishes between what he calls a real-wage or co-operative economy and an 
entrepreneur economy (i.e. between a system in which returns are certain to cover costs and 
one in which that is not guaranteed12), and remarks: 
                                                          
12 ‘In a co-operative or neutral economy, in which sales proceeds exceed variable cost by a determinate 
amount, effective demand cannot fluctuate; and it can be neglected in considering the factors which 
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The distinction between a co-operative economy and an entrepreneur economy bears 
some relation to a pregnant observation made by Karl Marx. . . . He pointed out that the 
nature of production in the actual world is not, as economists seem often to suppose, a 
case of C-M-C’, i.e. of exchanging commodity . . . for money in order to obtain another 
commodity . . .  That may be the standpoint of the private consumer. But it is not the 
attitude of business, which is a case of M-C-M’, i.e. of parting with money for 
commodity . . . in order to obtain more money.13 This is important for the following 
reason. 
The classical theory supposes that the readiness of the entrepreneur to start up a 
productive process depends on the amount of value in terms of product which he 
expects to fall to his share;  i.e. that only an expectation of more product for himself 
will induce him to offer more employment. But in an entrepreneur economy this is a 
wrong analysis of the nature of business calculation. An entrepreneur is interested, not 
in the amount of product, but in the amount of money which will fall to his share. He 
will increase his output if by doing so he expects to increase his money profit, even 
though this profit represents a smaller quantity of product than before. 
The explanation of this is evident. The employment of factors of production to increase 
output involves the entrepreneur in the disbursement, not of product, but of money. The 
choice before him in deciding whether or not to offer employment is a choice between 
using money in this way or in some other way or not using it at all. . . . The only 
question before him is to choose . . . that way which yields the largest profit in terms of 
money. 
It is worth noting that Thomas Chalmers (1832, pp.164-6), in a passage which Mill must have 
read, saw very clearly the situation of the capitalist entrepreneur. (Emphases in original): 
[W]hen a merchant brings commodities to the market, it is not generally in quest of 
other commodities to be given in return for them; . . . That is not the way of it. The 
proper object of the merchant is not to obtain, in return for the articles in which he 
deals, any one species of commodities more than another; but it is to extend his general 
power of purchasing all commodities. . . . The great object of the monied capitalist, in 
fact, is to add to the nominal amount of his fortune. . . .To advance his capital, as 
estimated in money, is the only way in which he can advance his interest as a merchant.  
. . . [T]he great aim of every trading capitalist is, to increase his fortune estimated in 
money. Commodities are not his terminating object, save in the spending of his revenue, 
and when he purchases for the sake of consumption. In the outlay of his capital, and 
when he purchases for the sake of production, money is his terminating object.14 If he 
starts at present with a certain sum expressed in pounds, shillings and pence, the great 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
determine the volume of employment. But in an entrepreneur economy the fluctuations of effective demand 
may be the dominating factor in determining the volume of employment.’ (Keynes, 1979, p.80) 
13 Compare Marx: ‘The path C-M-C proceeds from the extreme constituted by one commodity, and ends with 
the extreme constituted by another, which falls out of circulation and into consumption. Consumption, the 
satisfaction of needs, in short use-value, is therefore its final goal. The path M-C-M, however, proceeds from 
the extreme of money and finally returns to that same extreme. Its driving and motivating force, its 
determining purpose, is therefore exchange-value.’ (Marx, 1867/1976, p.250) 
14 Quoted, with approval, by Marx (1867/1976, p.254, fn.7) 
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end of his exertion or enterprise is, that after the current speculation is completed, he 
might start anew on another speculation, with a larger sum, expressed as before in 
pounds, shillings and pence; whether these have meanwhile increased or decreased in 
value. 
Chalmers concludes:  
Had this consideration been kept in view, we feel persuaded that the doctrine of the 
impossibility of a universal glut would never have been framed. 
Chalmers’s observation goes straight to the heart of the matter – he perceived very clearly that 
the proponents of the orthodox doctrine had failed to understand the nature of commercial 
operations in a capitalist economy, and the motivation which powers the system. 
It is from Mill’s adherence to the goods for goods (C-M-C) conception of economic activity 
that the fundamental difference between his and the alternative ‘heretical’ (and Keynesian) 
vision stems. Mill’s analysis of aggregate demand and employment is inappropriately tied to 
the conditions of a pre-capitalist, pre-industrial world. Mill’s treatment fails to engage with 
the realities of his contemporary world. In the pre-industrial context the very act of going to 
the market implies a corresponding desire to acquire other goods to bring home. 
But in a capitalist system (Keynes’s entrepreneur economy) the object of the exercise is to 
come away with a larger sum of money than that with which the entrepreneur started. The use 
money receipts to buy goods means not the natural completion of a market operation already 
started, but embarkation on a new venture. The potential for trouble is recognised when it is 
appreciated that the reinvestment of the proceeds from a completed operation is not 
automatic. Whether or not the entrepreneur applies his funds to a new project will depend on 
his assessment of (necessarily uncertain) future market conditions and the prospective 
profitability of the project; it is perfectly possible that an entrepreneur may come to the 
conclusion that the present is not an opportune time to commit his own (or borrowed) funds to 
a risky venture of uncertain prospects. Caution – that is to say, liquidity preference - may be 
the dominating consideration in the mind of the investor and a demand for money, or 
comparably safe assets, may consequently take the place of orders for new capital goods.  
The critical difference between the C-M-C conception of Sayian orthodoxy and the M-C-M’ 
conception of Marx and Keynes is that while the former envisages market activity as 
consisting of routine exchanges in which goods are offered in order to acquire goods, the 
latter recognises significant features of the real-world economy. Thus: (1) that in a capitalist 
system the purpose of a commercial venture is to turn money into more money; (2) that 
receipt of money from sales is not an intermediate stage in a market operation, but marks the 
results and completion of an operation; and (3) that money receipts will be re-spent on a new 
venture only if expectations of profit are, in the mind of the investor, sufficiently attractive to 
offset the inherent risks of a new operation. With C-M-C supply of goods is indeed demand 
for goods; with M-C-M’ it is the expectation of sales, that is, the effective demand for goods, 
that induces expenditures on labour and other resources necessary to supply these goods to the 
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market. Production and employment require prior investment in fixed and working capital and 
investment depends on future sales and expected profitability. Demand determines supply. 
It would appear that Mill, apparently without realising what he was doing, was propounding 
an analysis of aggregate demand which might have been applicable to the case of a pre-
capitalist agricultural economy, in which goods are offered to buy goods. But as regards a 
capitalist industrial system, his analysis was wide of the mark. 
Conclusion: no significant misrepresentation 
We suggest that, in the light of the views expressed by Mill, Keynes’s characterisation of Mill 
as an orthodox upholder of the ‘classical’ doctrine that ‘supply creates its own demand’ 
should not be considered misleading or inaccurate. Keynes did, it is true, misinterpret the 
passage he cited from Mill, but he did not misrepresent Mill’s fundamental position – it was 
indeed the case that Mill held by the doctrine that ‘the whole of the costs of production must 
necessarily be spent in the aggregate, directly or indirectly, on purchasing the product’. 
While Mill did not accept ‘Say’s Identity’, nor agree with his father and Say that an excess 
demand for money along with an excess supply of goods could never occur, he was 
nevertheless adamant in his contention that to explain the level of activity within the 
economy, it was to production - not demand - that one must look. The idea that the very act of 
producing for the market implies a corresponding intention to purchase from the market is 
categorically not Keynesian. As Marx said of Hegel, so Keynes might have said of Mill – that 
he required ‘to be set the other way up’ – that aggregate planned demand should be 
recognised as the independent determinant of output and employment, rather than demand 
being understood as a mere reflection of supply. 
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